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FREEDOM, COERCION, AND THE
LAW OF SERVITUDES
Gregory S. Alexandert
What do we want from a restatement of servitude law? Doctri-
nal simplification presents one obvious objective. Property teachers
and their students commonly observe that the law of servitudes is a
mess.' Servitude law consists of three separate categories of inter-
ests affecting the use of land: easements, real covenants, and equita-
ble servitudes, each regulated by its own rules and technical jargon.
Notoriously vague boundary lines separate these categories. More-
over, the different types of servitudes frequently perform redundant
land-use functions. The whole structure of common law land-use
interests has the image of rococo design. So, when Professor Susan
French, the Reporter for the restatement of servitude law, states
that she intends to restructure servitude law, developing for the first
time a unified body of rules that will eliminate the frustrating over-
laps and inconsistencies that characterize the extant system of ease-
ments, covenants, and equitable servitudes, 2 she is unlikely to start
anyone's blood boiling.
However, doctrinal simplification surely does not present the
only objective of the restatement. Developing a unified body of ser-
vitude doctrine, by itself, merely creates a sense of aesthetic coher-
ence. Presumably the project aims at achieving more than just that.
Law reformers generally seek to enhance the legal system's substan-
tive coherence. At this level--developing a set of substantively co-
herent doctrinal practices-I am skeptical about the servitude
restatement project.
A restatement requires a background theory that structures the
discourse by which the specific issues of policy are debated. Recent
scholarship on servitude law3 clearly indicates that such a back-
t Professor of Law, Cornell University. This Article is an expanded version of a
talk delivered to the Property Section of the Association of American Law Schools in
Miami Beach, Florida, on January 8, 1988.
1 See, e.g.,J. DUKEMINIER &J. KRIER, PROPERTY 959 (1981) ("The law of servitudes
is somewhat disorderly ... ").
2 French, Toward a Modern Law of Servitudes: Reweaving the Ancient Strands, 55 S. CAL.
L. REV. 1261 (1982).
3 See, eg., Epstein, Notice and Freedom of Contract in the Law of Servitudes, 55 S. CAL. L.
REV. 1353 (1982); French, supra note 2; Reichman, Toward a Unified Concept of Servitudes,
55 S. CAL. L. REV. 1177 (1982) [hereinafter Reichman, Unified Concept]; ReichmanJudi-
cial Supervision of Servitudes, 7 J. LEGAL STUD. 139 (1978) [hereinafter Reichman, Judicial
883
CORNELL LA W REVIEW
ground theory already exists for this restatement. That background
theory rests on the familiar, liberal distinction between individual
freedom of choice and coercion. Recent normative debates over
servitude law structured by that distinction have a familiar ring:
should servitude law be oriented by a strict contractarian ethic, as
Professor Richard Epstein urges,4 or should it include concessions
to a regulatory or interventionist ideology? This normative conflict
is the stuff of which the most contentious issues, especially retention
of the touch and concern requirement and recognition of a changed
conditions doctrine, are made. Although I offer some opinions on
these debates, my objective does not lie in taking sides in them, at
least not directly. My concern, rather, lies with the conceptual struc-
ture of these debates.
An essentialist quality permeates the way participants in these
debates have argued. They have implicitly assumed both the possi-
bility and the desirability of classifying every aspect of the legal ap-
paratus for adjusting conflicting land-use preferences as either
choice-maximizing or choice-inhibiting. Their discursive framework
makes freedom and coercion, choice and choicelessness, mutually
exclusive, radically alternative conditions. In their view, legal policy
can and should be set only after classifying the available options as
either choice-enhancing or choice-limiting, and then determining
whether private violation (choice) or social control (coercion) more
appropriately govern the issue. Obviously, a strong presumption fa-
vors private volition-coercion commonly thought of as excep-
tional, both descriptively and normatively.
Strong reasons support skepticism about this discursive struc-
ture. Its beguiling simplicity seriously distorts social reality. Choice
and coercion are not alternative objective social states that either
exist or do not exist. Rather they are rhetorics that, though contra-
dictory, are both always available as interpretations of any given so-
cial experience. Pretending that they are more than just opposing
rhetorics creates a form of nominalism that privileges one under-
standing, one interpretation.
The discursive structure of the individual choice/collective co-
ercion dichotomy ultimately undermines the very political vision to
which it purports to commit, the liberal vision of human empower-
ment. As long as legal doctrine defines the normative and doctrinal
possibilities by an unproblematic distinction between freedom of
choice and coercion, it will perpetuate coercion in social relation-
Supervision]; Rose, Servitudes, Security, and Assent: Some Comments on Professors Reichman and
French, 55 S. CAL. L. REV. 1403 (1982); Sterk, Freedom from Freedom of Contract: The Endur-
ing Value of Servitude Restrictions, 70 IowA L. REv. 615 (1985).
4 Epstein, supra note 3.
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ships among landholders. Law reformers fail to understand that
coercion cannot be avoided, or even cabined, by simply asserting a
commitment to maximizing individual freedom of choice. Choice
and choicelessness do not occupy isolated realms of human activity.
Rather they continuously intrude upon each other. Coping with the
problem of coercion requires that we constantly reexamine and un-
settle our settled understandings and doctrinal practices.
In this Article, I will discuss how the rhetoric of freedom of
choice and coercion obscures the choicelessness problem as exper-
ienced by actors in nominally consensual land transactions. To be-
gin with, I will sketch briefly the general contours of the social
theory underlying the distinction between freedom of choice and
coercion. In Part II, I will describe liberal legal theory's use of the
free choice/coercion distinction to explain the process by which the
legal system accommodates conflicting land-use preferences. In
Part III, I will use the recent debates over the touch and concern
doctrine and the changed conditions doctrine to illustrate that free-
dom of choice and coercion represent two equally available rheto-
rics rather than objectively identifiable end-states. Part IV places
the current rhetorical practices in historical perspective by showing
the similarity between the arguments surrounding the first restate-
ment of servitudes and their counterparts forty years later.
I
THE BACKGROUND THEORY OF CHOICE AND COERCION
Scholars commonly frame legal issues in terms of a trade-off
between private volition and social control. 5 This simply applies the
general social theory of liberalism to specific questions. That theory
divides all human activity into two distinct realms: choice and
choicelessness. 6 It then supposes that a social equilibrium can be
achieved by the right mix of choice and choicelessness.
According to liberal theory, the social order remains coherent
despite the simultaneous presence of these opposed modes of gov-
ernance because they remain separate. Each mode governs appro-
priate areas of social life. Liberals disagree among themselves about
both the correct description of the respective levels of choice and
choicelessness in society and the normatively appropriate mixture.
But they do agree that, in theory at least, coercive social states of
5 See F. KESSLER & G. GILMORE, CONTRAcrs 1-13 (2d ed.1970); Epstein, supra note
3.
6 For critical accounts of this vision in other doctrinal contexts, see Dalton, An
Essay in the Deconstruciion of Contract Doctrine, 94 YALE L.J. 997 (1985); Frug, The City as a
Legal Concept, 93 HARV. L. REv. 1059 (1980); Olsen, The Family and the Market: A Study of
Ideology and Legal Reform, 96 HARV. L. REv. 1497 (1983).
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affairs can be readily identified. They define the relationship be-
tween choice and choicelessness in either/or terms, rather than as
two simultaneously, but contradictory, sets of discourse. In other
words, they regard the distinction between choice and choiceless-
ness as relatively unproblematic.
II
THE UNDERLYING POLITICAL VISION OF SERVITUDE LAW
Mainstream legal scholars rely on the freedom of choice/coer-
cion dichotomy in virtually every controversial modem servitudes
law debate. They assume the discreteness and ready discoverability
of the realms of individual free choice and coercion. These scholars
also assume that servitude law generally enhances individual free-
dom of choice, and they advance ideological commitments under
the guise of neutrally maximizing individual preferences.7 In this
part, I describe how the free choice/coercion dichotomy structures
the standard legal vision of the role of servitudes in American prop-
erty law. Turning to the internal law of servitudes, I then sketch the
role played by the free choice/coercion dichotomy in rationalizing
the very idea of a land-use obligation that binds non-promisors.
A. Servitudes versus Zoning
The basic contrast that property lawyers draw between servi-
tudes and zoning as land-use planning methods illustrate how legal
scholarship uses the free choice/coercion dichotomy to privilege a
value choice. Property scholars have used the free choice/coercion
dichotomy to privilege servitudes over zoning as ways of accommo-
dating competing desires among land users. The writings of those
who argue from explicitly libertarian or wealth-maximizing premises
must apparently illustrate this theory8 but other centrist commenta-
tors also comply with it.9 Most property scholars emphasize the fa-
7 See, e.g., Dunham, Promises Respecting the Use of Land, 8J. LAw & ECON. 133, 162-65
(1965); Ellickson, Cities and Homeowners Associations, 130 U. PA. L. REV. 1519 (1982); Ep-
stein, Covenants and Constitutions, 73 CORNELL L. REV. 906 (1988) [hereinafter Epstein,
Covenants and Constitutions]; Epstein, supra note 3; Reichman,Judicial Supervision, supra
note 3.
8 E.g., B. SIEGAN, LAND USE WITHOUT ZONING (1972); Ellickson, Alternatives to Zon-
ing: Covenants, Nuisance Rules, and Fines as Land Use Controls, 40 U. CHI. L. REV. 681
(1973). For a somewhat softer endorsement of "private" alternatives to zoning by an
economist, see W. FISCHEL, THE ECONOMICS OF ZONING LAws 164 (1985): "I am sympa-
thetic to reforms that increase reliance on these devices [covenants, easements, and resi-
dential private governments], but I remain skeptical of them as complete replacements
for zoning restrictions."
9 E.g., Kmiec, Deregulatory Land Use: An Alternative to Free Enterprise Development Sys-
tem, 130 U. PA. L REV. 28 (198 1); Note, Lane Use Control in Metropolitan Areas: The Failure of
Zoning and a Proposed Alternative, 45 S. CAL. L. REV. 335 (1972).
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miliar characterization of servitudes as a .private mechanism for
adjusting land-use preferences and zoning as a form of collective, or
public, regulation.10 This contrast immediately places zoning in a
disfavored position, even among centrist liberals. Liberals widely
believe that public regulation raises much more serious problems, in
terms of both political legitimacy and cost-reduction, than does
privatized regulation. Liberals have attacked zoning as generally
less efficient and less equitable than private alternatives, including
servitudes." I
Robert Ellickson's article Cities and Homeowners Associations 12 il-
lustrates the use of the free choice/collective coercion contrast as a
shorthand way of privileging servitudes. In comparing homeown-
ers' associations with cities, Ellickson tries to have it both ways. At
times he argues that commentators vastly overdraw the distinction
between cities and homeowners' associations and that the two
modes of governance should be subject to similar legal treatment.
For other purposes, however, he argues that fundamental differ-
ences exist between the two and that homeowners' associations, as
private arrangements, should receive greater legal deference.' 3
Ellickson conceptualizes homeowners' associations as private
residential governments, with a constitution composed of various
servitudes. 14 He argues that the nature of their membership
presents the only important difference between such private govern-
ments and cities-membership in homeowners' associations being
"perfectly voluntary," while membership in cities at best being im-
perfectly voluntary. 15 He concludes that homeowners' associations
should have greater powers than they presently do because of their
greater voluntariness. Restating his argument to highlight its use of
the free choice/coercion dichotomy, I will borrow some jargon pop-
ular among legal economists, including the distinctions developed
by the political economist Albert Hirschman. 16
Suppose that a city and a homeowners' association both impose
the same building height restriction on residents. The city imposed
10 SeeJ. DUKEMINIER &J. KRIER, supra note 1, at 915-16.
11 See, e.g., B. SIEGAN, supra note 8; Dunham, A Legal and Economic Basis for City Plan-
ning, 58 CoLUM. L. REV. 659 (1958); Ellickson, supra note 8, at 681; Kmiec, supra note 9,
at 28.
12 Ellickson, supra note 7.
13 Id. at 152-53. As Gerald Frug has explained, a preference for protecting prop-
erty rights over all other values underlies Ellickson's apparent schizophrenia about the
character of homeowners' associations. Frug, Cities and Homeowners Associations: A Reply,
130 U. PA. L. REV. 1589, 1594-96 (1982).
14 See also Reichman, Residential Private Governments: An Introductory Survey, 43 U. CHI.
L. REV. 253 (1976).
15 Ellickson, supra note 7, at 1520.
16 A. HIRSCHMAN, EXIT, VOICE, AND LOYALTY (1970).
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its restriction through a zoning measure, while the homeowners' as-
sociation imposed its restriction through a covenant in its original
declaration of restrictions. Ellickson contends that the zoning mea-
sure raises greater fairness and efficiency objections than the servi-
tude does. Unlike the homeowners' association provision, included
as a part of all of the purchasers' deeds, no unanimous consent for
the municipality's zoning measure was obtained, only a majority
vote was required. The existence of unanimous consent, obtained
through individual contracting between the developer and each af-
fected owner, assures complete loyalty for the association's height
restriction among all of the community's members. No such assur-
ance exists for the zoning provision. Membership (i.e., residence) in
the city does not itself signify loyalty to this or any other provision
of city governance. If voice, through attempts to remove the restric-
tion through the political system proves ineffective or unattractive
because of the high costs of securing political change, then exit rep-
resents the only alternative to loyalty. Exit is at best an imperfect
strategy for disgruntled land owners because the immobility of their
asset limits their options. They can convert their land to capital by
selling it, but selling represents capitulating on the very matter at
issue: to be able to use their land free from the unwanted height
restriction. To keep the land, they must comply with the restriction
(grudging loyalty); to avoid the restriction they must give up the
land (exit). Either way, the coercive effects of the public regulation
stand in stark contrast, according to this analysis, to the developer's
servitude.
Ellickson's argument represents only a particularly clear exam-
ple of how policy analysts 17 attempt to privilege servitudes as a
method of governance by simply assuming a categorical distinction
between choice and choicelessness, and then locating servitudes in
the realm of choice and relegating zoning, as an instance of "public"
regulation, to the realm of choicelessness.
In an ironic way, one can view Ellickson's analysis as support-
ing my argument about the problematic character of the free
choice/coercion dichotomy. His model of planned residential de-
velopment's constitutions as a system of uniform schemes of resi-
dential servitudes-a model that Richard Epstein endorses in his
paperI 8-implicitly recognizes that coercion exists even in the nomi-
nally private sphere.
17 For an example of this view from an economist, see Fischel, The Economics of Land
Use Exactions: A Property Rights Analysis, 50 LAw & CONTEMP. PROBS. 101, 107 (1987).
18 Epstein, Covenants and Constitutions, supra note 7, at 927 (1988).
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B. Reconciling Running Covenants with Individual Freedom
The notion of a land-use obligation binding persons who did
not make the promise presents something of an anomaly in the lib-
eral conception of property. Indeed the term "servitude" embar-
rasses a property regime committed to the autonomy of private
owners.1 9 So liberal legal theory has had to develop a rationale
which reconciles the legal notion of obligations that bind all succes-
sive owners with the liberal commitment to private owner auton-
omy. That rationale presents essentially a contractarian argument
that relies on the freedom/coercion dichotomy.
The standard explanation used to reconcile running covenants
with individual freedom is that a legal system that holds a subse-
quent owner to a promise made by a predecessor is in fact enforcing
private intentions. This intentionalist model necessitates assuming
that the person who succeeded to the promisor's estate has assented
to the obligation even though he may never have expressed his con-
sent.20 The purchaser manifested her assent simply by purchasing
land subject to a discoverable obligation. The obligation is not law-
imposed but privately created, and the whole regime of land-use ob-
ligations running with the land is thereby erected on the foundation
of free choice.
The contractarian rationale's normative force depends upon
the coherence of the distinction between choice and choicelessness
as social phenomena. If in social reality actors pervasively experi-
ence choicelessness in conditions of nominal freedom, then entitle-
ment assignments justified by the principle of individual autonomy
appear arbitrary. They are, at least, not grounded solely in the neu-
tral norm of maximizing individual choice.
Liberal legal discourse itself undermines the justificatory appa-
ratus predicated on our ability to identify a distinct realm of social
action ordered strictly by individual, subjective choice. In the next
part, I will discuss recent debates over the touch and concern doc-
trine and the changed conditions doctrine to illustrate both how an
essentialist freedom/coercion dichotomy informs legal discourse
about servitude law and how legal discourse itself undermines that
essentialism.
19 See Rose, supra note 3, at 1403.
20 Recognizing the importance of the assent theme in servitude law, Carol Rose
points out, correctly in my opinion, that "fairness" considerations, which modern prop-
erty scholars widely believe to inhere in servitude law, are better framed as matters af-
fecting consent. Revising fairness into consent helps to explain why contract theory
played such a major role in the development of servitude law during the nineteenth
century. See id. at 1404 n.8.
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III
Two DEBATES IN SERVITUDE LAW
Two issues in American servitude law have been most contro-
versial in recent years; first, whether to retain the traditional touch
and concern rule; and, second, whether to recognize a doctrine for
terminating or modifying all types of servitudes on the basis of
changed conditions. I critique the free choice/coercion dichotomy
by demonstrating that both sides claim that their position enhances
freedom of choice on each of these issues. I contend that most legal
discourse continues to commit the formalist mistake of attempting
to derive determinate solutions from an abstract principle, in this
case, the principle of individual freedom of property owners.
A. The Touch and Concern Debate
Suppose that a promisor and promisee created a restrictive cov-
enant, indicating clearly their intent to bind all successors, based on
their mutual belief that some negative externality would exist if the
land were unbounded and that the harmful externality would be of
equal concern to all subsequent owners. It turns out, however, that
the promisor's successor does not see things the same way and pre-
fers that the land be unbounded. If the successor nevertheless buys
the land, should he be bound by the servitude because he has cho-
sen it? Or is there room in the concept of individual choice for a
filtering device like touch and concern?
1. The Problem of Indeterminacy in Freedom of Choice
Recent arguments over whether to retain the common-law
touch and concern requirement illustrate how the liberal free-
dom/coercion dichotomy leads to stalemate. On behalf of retaining
the rule, Uriel Reichman has argued that the rule enhances individ-
ual free choice. He states: "Servitudes are a kind of private legisla-
tion affecting a line of future owners. Limiting such legislative
powers to an objective purpose of land planning eliminates the pos-
sibility of creating modern variations of feudal serfdom."2' This fa-
miliar argument appears in virtually every instance where the
question of dead hand control appears. 22 It supposes that the prob-
lem ofjustice between generations can be resolved by enforcing the
freedom of choice principle. 23 Unless we have some device like
21 Reichman, Unified Concept, supra note 3, at 1233.
22 For a critique of this argument in the context of another instance of the dead
hand problem, see Alexander, The Dead Hand and the Law of Trusts in the Nineteenth Century,
37 STAN. L. REV. 1189 (1985).
23 Professor Epstein regards the problem of inter-generational justice as implicated
only by the changed conditions doctrine. Epstein, Covenant and Constitutions, supra note 7.
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touch and concern, the argument goes, the dead hand of past gener-
ations will deny future generations the same freedom enjoyed by
their ancestors, just as feudal institutions like the fee tail (at least
before the invention of common recovery) made it possible for fa-
thers to lock their sons' ownership interests in servitude.
On the other side of the ledger, Professor Epstein offers an-
other familiar argument. He attacks the libertarian defense of the
touch and concern requirement as standing freedom on its head.
The touch and concern requirement, like the Rule Against Perpetu-
ities and the doctrine against restraints on alienation, is a collective
restriction on the current owner's freedom of choice. Epstein
argues:
To say ... that particular covenants must be struck down in the
name of freedom is to confound the usual understanding on
which freedom claims are based.... Insistence upon the touch
and concern requirement denies the original parties their contrac-
tual freedom by subordinating their desires to the interests of fu-
ture third parties, who by definition have no proprietary claim to
the subject property.24
Both arguments present plausible interpretations of the notion
of securing freedom of choice for land owners. Reichman's inter-
pretation seeks to maximize the liberty interests of all owners, pres-
ent and future. Epstein's interpretation maximizes the freedom of
the only owner at the time the servitude is created.
The choice between these two contradictory interpretations
cannot be based on an abstract commitment to freedom of choice
itself; both choices are simultaneously freedom-enhancing and coer-
cive. Epstein and Reichman want to sanctify a subjective political
choice-the allocation of power between generations of owners-by
In my view, arguments for the touch and concern requirement and the changed condi-
tions doctrine apply to different aspects of inter-generational justice. Touch and con-
cern operates in the same fashion as the common law Rule Against Perpetuities-it
applies retrospectively, voiding the interest ab initio. Its justification is simply to maxi-
mize the principle of freedom of use and disposition by preserving that freedom for each
generation. In theory, this justification does not depend on the exogenous changes that
affect future generations. By contrast, the changed conditions doctrine does rest on
such changes. Unlike touch and concern, changed conditions regards the servitude as
valid when initially created, but rendered burdensome to subsequent generations by
alterations in the environment in which the servitude operates, and therefore negatible.
24 Epstein, supra note 3, at 1359-1360. Professor Stewart Sterk's article, supra note
3, provides a trenchant critique of Epstein's contractarian theory of servitudes.
Professor Susan French takes something of a middle position. Agreeing with
Reichman that touch and concern properly protects private intentions, she nevertheless
supports Epstein's call to abolish the requirement. She prefers to deal with the pioblem
of unreasonable burdens through an expanded changed conditions doctrine of termina-
tion. French, Servitudes Reform and the New Restatement of Property: Creation Doctrines and
Structural Simplification, 73 CORNELL L. REv. 928, 939-40, 951 (1988).
1988] 891
CORNELL LA W REVIEW
a linguistic gambit, namely, objectifying their political preference as
choice maximizing and therefore more consistent with the general
policy of servitude law.
The same problem besets the law-and-economics analysis of the
touch and concern requirement. Some legal economists argue that
the purpose of running covenants is to effectuate intent by enforc-
ing promises that, absent transactions costs, would have survived
successive rounds of bargaining among subsequent generations of
owners. 25 The touch and concern requirement function filters out
those restrictions that subsequent owners would not have agreed to
had there been actual negotiations. 26 This analysis reconciles touch
and concern with freedom of choice to the extent that restrictions
that would not have survived subsequent negotiations are not
chosen.
But one can also see this rationale as choice-denying rather
than choice-enforcing. This is, I take it, the thrust of Professor Ep-
stein's attack on the touch and concern rule. If the subsequent
owner of a parcel burdened with a servitude bought the land with
notice of the term, she has chosen it. Moreover, so long as there
was notice, the subsequent owner who takes land subject to an un-
wanted servitude presumably has been compensated for that term
by an appropriate discount in the purchase price. Presumably, the
promisor initially received the discount from the promisee and sim-
ply passed it on to his successor. This discount must have been
equal to the servitude's worth to the promisee or else he would not
have agreed to it. Hence, the touch and concern filter is unneces-
sary because there was no coercion in any of the relationships.
2. Notice and Consent
I now examine Professor Epstein's argument deriving consent
from notice. Several reasons make notice alone an insufficient guar-
antee of choice. One immediate reason, the purchaser who acted
without actual notice that the land she purchased was affected with
an obligation may still be held to have had notice. The legal notion
of constructive notice, provided by the land recording system,27 or
25 R. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAw 58-59 (3d ed. 1986); Krier, Book Review,
122 U. PA. L. REv. 1664, 1678-80 (1974).
26 See Krier, supra, note 25, at 1678-80.
27 The quality of notice provided by the recording system, of course, depends upon
how each jurisdiction defines the "chain of title" concept. One version of that concept
holds the purchaser to have received record notice of a servitude even though the servi-
tude did not appear in her direct chain of title. The familiar case for this view is Finley v.
Glenn, 303 Pa. 131, 137, 154 A. 299, 301 (1931) ("The purpose in recording is to give
notice and the notice given is not only of the land conveyed but 'concerning' any lands.
Certainly a restriction concerns the lands restricted.").
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by the surrounding circumstances, which may place on the pur-
chaser a duty to inquire about the existence of restrictions28 creates
this notice. If we base an inference of consent on this type of notice
we greatly diminish the meaning, and the normative power, of con-
sent. Ordinary understandings tell us that consent so inferred looks
remarkably similar to the sort of collectively-imposed decision that
Professor Epstein and others worry about.
The phenomenon of distortion in the formation of preferences
presents a second and more serious objection to the equation of
consent with notice. Enforcement of servitudes raises familiar ques-
tions about when and on what basis it is appropriate for legal regu-
lators to interfere with private preferences. 29 Professor Epstein
believes that the legal system should enforce preferences unless
they generate harms (externalities) to other people. Because Ep-
stein believes servitudes create few externalities, he concludes that
courts should rarely interfere with servitudes. This general attitude
towards the preferences expressed in servitudes leads him specifi-
cally to oppose the touch and concern requirement, which prevents
servitudes from running with the land ab initio, and the changed
conditions doctrine, which terminates initially enforceable servi-
tudes some time after their creation. In Epstein's view, so long as
purchasers from the original contracting parties had legal notice of
the servitude they chose to accept it and courts should therefore not
interfere with that expressed preference.30
Several serious problems arise with the view that the only valid
ground for collective interference with the enforcement of private
preferences is to prevent negative externalities. First, the concept
of externalities itself notoriously is ambiguous.3 1 This objection
would hardly be worth mentioning but for Professor Epstein's em-
phasis on the importance of legal certainty ex ante to facilitate private
planning. A legal norm whose operation depends on whether a
negative externality exists is unlikely to achieve the certainty that
Professor Epstein regards as indispensable to private ordering.
More importantly, externalities do not represent the onlyjustif-
icatory basis for legal interference with private preference. Para-
doxically, pathology in the process of preference formation may also
28 For an extreme example of binding subsequent land purchasers by inquiry no-
tice, see Sanborn v. McLean, 233 Mich. 227, 206 N.W. 496 (1925) (subsequent purchaser
bound by inquiry notice despite the fact that the servitude was "implied" from a com-
mon plan which itself was not expressed in any of the paperwork).
29 For a particulary clear summary of the general problem, see Sunstein, Legal Inter-
ference with Private Preferences, 53 U. CHi. L. REV. 1129 (1986).
30 Epstein, supra note 7, at 910 (touch and concern), 919-24 (changed conditions).
31 See, e.g., Kennedy, Cost-Benefit Analysis of Entitlement Problems: A Critique, 33 STAN. L.
REV. 387 (1981); Sunstein, supra note 29, at 1131.
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justify legal intervention as necessary to protect the autonomy of
individual preferences. In other words, the purchaser's expressed
preference for the servitude may not be the product of autonomous
choice. For example, one of the phenomena that social choice theo-
rists have observed as distorting individual preferences is the adap-
tation of preferences to what people think (correctly or incorrectly)
they can get.32 Most residential developments today include a vari-
ety of restrictions of owner use and behavior. The pervasive inclu-
sion of restrictions in residential developments may reflect not the
similarity of preferences held by thousands of purchasers but the
purchasers' belief (based on the widespread use of detailed restric-
tions) that ownership in a residential development without a partic-
ular restriction is unavailable. The consequence of this pervasive
belief is that one cannot simply assume that restrictions are included
in deeds because purchasers want them there. Maximizing the au-
tonomy of purchasers' preferences may therefore require legal in-
terference with their nominal preferences.
The argument that pathological preference formation justifies
non-enforcement of preferences, unlike Epstein's argument, recog-
nizes and responds to the possibility that individual preferences as
expressed through the act of purchase with legal notice of an en-
cumbrance may be defective. Rather than taking preferences as ex-
ogenous givens, this argument recognizes that preferences are
social constructs. 33
Related to the problem of distorted preferences is what Mark
Kelman has called the "bundling" problem.3 4 The promisor's suc-
cessor may have bought the land even though she did not want it
with the restriction because she was unable to control all of the the-
oretically available terms. The familiar argument at this point runs
that if she was aware (perhaps meaning that she had actual, as op-
posed to constructive notice) of an unwanted restriction and never-
theless purchased the package offered by the promisor, then she
must have been compensated for the unwanted servitude by a dis-
count in the purchase price. But we should not be too quick to
make that assumption. In a complex transaction the successor (S)
may not have adequately focused on the servitude term. S might
have demanded a higher level of compensation for the servitude
32 This is the behaviorial phenomenon that Jon Elster has labelled "sour grapes."
SeeJ. ELSTER, SOUR GRAPES passim (1983); Elster, Introduction, in RATIONAL CHOICE 1, 15
(J. Elster ed. 1986) [hereinafter Elsler, Introduction]; Sunstein, supra note 29, at 1146-58.
See also March, Bounded Rationality, Ambiguity, and the Engineering of Choice, in RATIONAL
CHOICE 142 (J. Elster ed. 1986).
33 See Sunstein, supra note 29, at 1133 ("private preferences are ... entitled at most
to presumptive respect.., they are social constructs.").
34 M. KELMAN, A GUIDE TO CRITICAL LEGAL STUDIES 107-09 (1987).
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te hm, had that term been negotiated individually rather than as part
of a package containing many items.
A predictable reaction to this argument is that S's failure ade-
quately to discount the price she pays for the land burdened with
the servitude represents irrational behavior. But that is just the
point; people do engage in irrational behavior.3 5 How can con-
tractarians reconcile shrugging off irrational behavior with the prin-
ciple of maximizing individual choice? Does not the commitment to
maintaining servitude law as a realm of uncoerced activity require
that we take such behavior into account? Why is it any less a form of
coercion to enforce a restriction against an individual who was inad-
equately compensated for it, simply because we say his deficient
evaluation of the entitlement represented by the servitude was
"irrational"?
Contractarians might argue that the behavior just described is
exceptional and that rules should be based on the typical case rather
than on aberrations. But this argument fails to respond to my point.
The significance of the bundling problem is not the level of its inci-
dence (although I am prepared to argue that it is not aberrational at
all) but its undermining effect on the model of free choice and coer-
cion as located in separate, mutually exclusive spheres of activity. It
casts doubt on our ability to make easy distinctions between legal
options that are choice-enhancing and those that are coercive.
3. Objective Tests and Denial of the Self
Before leaving the touch and concern requirement debate I
want to address one additional argument to illustrate how choice-
lessness intrudes upon the discourse of individual freedom in main-
stream legal reasoning. Reichman argues that the touch and
concern rule is, and should be, used to enforce those promises that
are "objectively intended to promote land utilization."3 6 He con-
trasts this with Charles Clark's subjective test according to which
benefits and burdens should run to assignees if the servitude affects
35 That Epstein takes me to task for observing that people sometimes act foolishly
is surprising. The observation is common with the literature on rational choice theory.
See, e.g., March, supra note 32, at 165 ("Not all behavior makes sense; some of it is unrea-
sonable. Not all decision technology is intelligent; some of it is foolish."). And recent
social science scholarship has emphasized the desire of systematic error in individual
decision-making. See .e.g, JUDGMENT UNDER UNCERTAINTY: HEURISTICS AND BIASES (D.
Kahneman, P. Slovic & A. Tverski eds. 1982). The real question is what implications the
irrational choice phenomenon should have for the legal role. My view is that it should
affect that legal system's willingness to interfere with preferences, the realm of private
ordering. Insofar as these differences among reasons for choices being nonautonomous
are themselves unpredictable, legal doctrine must maintain an openness to interpreta-
tions of specific preferences as nonautonomous.
36 Reichman, Judicial Supervision, supra note 3, at 151-52.
1988] 895
CORNELL LA W REVIEW
the landowner's valuation of his land.37 To demonstrate the desira-
bility of an objective approach to touch and concern, Reichman
contrasts two hypothetical fact situations involving similar restric-
tions. 38 In one, an owner extracts from his neighbor a promise that
the neighbor will not drink alcoholic beverages on the Jewish Sab-
bath. In the second, a developer imposes in all deeds within a
neighborhood a restriction against running a tavern in the neigh-
borhood. Reichman asserts that only in the second case does the
servitude touch and concern because the restriction against alcohol
in that situation is objectively associated with the owners' use and
enjoyment of their land. Conversely, the restriction against alcohol
consumption in the first case, according to Reichman, was imposed
only for "ideological" reasons. Viewed objectively, such restrictions
are not connected with the effective use of land. They do not touch
and concern, and therefore should not be considered servitudes.
Professor Epstein has pointed out that Reichman's analysis
begs the question of why the first restriction is unrelated to land
development. Any objective test for touch and concern, Epstein
states, "presupposes that we have some collective vision of what
[the private land system] is supposed to do." 39 According to Ep-
stein, then, Reichman transparently has stuffed the proverbial rabbit
into the hat.
Here, Epstein is clearly right. Requiring that a restriction be
"objectively" intended to promote land utilization creates choice-
lessness under the guise of respecting private intentions. The ob-
jective perspective constructs private intentions from a set of beliefs
which are supposedly generally held in the community. This con-
ception of private intention, however, reduces the subjective indi-
vidual will to the collective will. By supposing that each person has
the tastes of everyone else, this conception subordinates individual
autonomy to the forces external to the self.40 It is a particularly in-
sidious form of coercion because it purports to effectuate private
intentions rather than acknowledging that private volition is being
sacrificed for the sake of some collective good. Here, again, free
37 C. CLARK, REAL COVENANTS AND OTHER INTERESTS WHICH "RUN WITH LAND" I 11
(1929).
38 Reichman, Judicial Supervision, supra note 3, at 51-52.
39 Epstein, supra note 3, at 1359.
40 The same problem occurs in doctrines based on the theory of imputing intention
from conduct, sth as creation of easements by implication. See Sterk, Neighbors in Ameri-
can Land Law, 87 COLUM. L. REV. 55, 57 (1987) ("Because not every member of the
society will be identically socialized, a rule that presumes intent from conduct will fre-
quently sacrifice intent to other objectives-reinforcement of social norms, or the effi-
ciency-related goal of effectuating party intent in the greatest number of cases.") See also
M. KELMAN, supra note 34, at 86-113 (discussing intentionalistic and deterministic de-
scriptions in liberal discourse).
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choice and coercion represent contradictory discourses that are si-
multaneously deployed in mainstream legal argumentation.
The touch and concern controversy belies the attempt to depict
servitudes as a noncollective, nonpolitical (and therefore, in liberal
ideology, presumptively more legitimate) instrument by which to re-
solve social disputes among landholders. The easy availability of
the notions of free choice and coercion in the arguments establishes
as an impossible dream the vision of a purely private, uncoercive
regime of servitude law.
Thus far, I have used the touch and concern controversy to un-
dermine the view that servitude law is, or can be, a realm of private
ordering, a legal regime that enables conflicting preferences for the
use of land to be made without the intrusion of substantive public
norms. With respect to the issue itself, I favor retaining the touch
and concern requirement as a discretionary norm, the purpose of
which is to protect subsequent purchasers who have behaved fool-
ishly and to prevent promisors and their successors from behaving
opportunistically. However, we should resist the temptation to
lapse into the familiar imagery that would describe touch and con-
cern as a limited instance of collective regulation that somehow
compatibly coexists with a general body of doctrine constructed on
the foundation of individual freedom of choice. That account (like
its counterparts in contract law depicting the unconscionability and
promissory estoppel doctrines as collectivist "exceptions" that coex-
ist with the grundnorm of private ordering) represses the pervasive
presence within legal thought and practice of "irreducible, irremedi-
able, irresolvable conflict." 4 1 The standard doctrinal imagery of an
individualistic core with collectivistic exceptions lulls us into sup-
posing that only a limited number of doctrines engenders painful
and embarrassing conflicts of social visions. However settled the
doctrinal practice appears to be, such conflicts only lie beneath the
surface. We would be better off acknowledging those conflicts and
trying to work them out openly and continuously rather than freez-
ing doctrinal practices that entrench power arrangements. Touch
and concern represents, as its critics fear, a destabilizing doctrine,
but that is why it should be embraced, not spurned.
While the substance of touch and concern ought to be retained,
I find it impossible to justify preserving its metaphysical packaging.
The phrase "touch and concern" continues to beguile even astute
property specialists into believing that it has some objective mean-
ing. Imagine how many ordinary non-lawyers similarly have been
tricked. I favor finding a new bottle for the old wine, preferably a
41 M. KELMAN, supra note 34, at 3.
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bottle whose label indicates its discretionary and normative
character.
B. The Changed Conditions Debate
Perhaps the most controversial issue facing the new restate-
ment is whether to recognize a general changed conditions doctrine
for terminating servitudes. Professor French supports such a doc-
trine, but several other scholars, including Professor Epstein, have
argued strongly against it. As in the case of the touch and concern
rule, the debate has been framed by the free choice/coercion
dichotomy.
The changed conditions doctrine responds to the problem of
obsolescence in servitude law. The obsolescence problem is not pe-
culiar to servitudes; it is a function of duration, and it exists in all
legal arrangements that have extended time horizons, including
long-term trusts and relational contracts. 42 The dilemma posed by
obsolescence for liberal legal thought is how legal intervention that
terminates the obsolete property interest can coexist with the basic
commitment to private volition.
In one sense, it seems easier to reconcile with the commitment
to individual autonomy legal intervention based on changed condi-
tions than legal interference based on a requirement like touch and
concern. Personality, identity, and self are. constituted by context.
As Professor Sterk points oUt,4 3 the self that is affected by subse-
quent, unforeseeable events differs in significant respects from the
self that made the initial commitment to the servitude. Further-
more, these different selves have different preferences. The point
here is not that the legal system should always respond to regret.
Rather, the argument is that changed conditions have caused prefer-
ences to lose their force.44 By contrast, the touch and concern re-
quirement, insofar as it permits escape from a servitude obligation
even though conditions remain unchanged, allows parties to avoid
the consequences of a bad choice.
The theory of imputed intent presents a similar argument by
which to reconcile this form of legal intervention with individual
preferences. Advocates of the changed conditions doctrine and its
analogues in other corners of property law (such as the cy pres doc-
42 See, e.g., Hillman, Court-Adjustment of Long-Term Contracts: An Analysis Under Mod-
ern Contract Law, 1987 DUKE LJ. 1 (1987); Scott, Conflict and Cooperation in Long-Term Con-
tracts, 75 CALIF. L. REV. 2005 (1987).
43 Sterk, Foresight and the Law of Servitudes, 73 CORNELL L. REv. 956, 958 (1988). See
generally D. PARFIT, REASONS AND PERSONS 199-347 (1984).
44 Here I am distinguishing inconsistent time preferences from changes in future
preferences caused by altered circumstances other than time itself. See Elster, supra note
32, at 11, 15-16.
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trine in the law of trusts) have argued that we should impute to the
original contracting parties an intention that the covenant expire if
and when it becomes valueless. 45 Posner's analysis of the dead hand
problem is a particularly clear example of this transformation of col-
lective interference into private volition:
[T]he dilemma whether to enforce the testator's intent or to mod-
ify the terms of the will in accordance with changed conditions
since his death is often a false one. A policy of rigid adherence to
the letter of the donative instrument is likely to frustrate both the
donor's purposes and the efficient use of resources.46
One can plausibly respond, however, that this argument is dis-
engenuous; it stands the notion of private choice on its head. As in
the touch and concern context, the argument constructs a concep-
tion of the self on the basis of the will of the group. By identifying
individual preference with the aggregate preferences of a group at a
later time, it denies the autonomy of the self.
At the same time an element of choicelessness arises when ser-
vitudes have become obsolete that makes a changed conditions doc-
trine, or something like it, attractive. The servitude's obsolescence
means that those burdened by the servitude have strong incentives
to buy the entitlement from the beneficiary. Even assuming that the
transaction costs are otherwise low, the exchange may not occur be-
cause of strategic behavior by the beneficiary, who knows the bur-
dened landowner has strong incentives, and by the burdened
landowner, who knows that the beneficiary can realize the entitle-
ment's value in an exchange with him. A pathology of choice char-
acterizes this familiar situation of bilateral monopoly. Neither side
experiences the liberation of an unconstrained market; both sides
feel themselves in servitude to each other. Formally, of course, both
sides are unconstrained: they are free to walk away. But they do
experience constraint. Intervention from an external source, by way
of outright termination or, perhaps, as Professor French suggests,
through modification, 47 may enable the parties to do what they lack
45 See II American Law of Property § 9.22, at 398 (A. Casner ed. 1952); Reichman,
Unified Concept, supra note 3, at 1259.
46 R. POSNER, EcONOMic ANALYSIS OF LAW § 18.3, at 390 (2d ed. 1977). Note how
this argument serves the twin goals of respecting private intentions and economic effi-
ciency. Curiously, Posner does not apply the same argument to the touch and concern
requirement, which he opposes despite its obvious connection with the problem of ob-
solescence. He prefers to deal with the problem of obsolete servitudes by switching
from, in Calabresian terms, a property rule to a liability rule, i.e., from legal protection
through injunction to protecting the entitlement through damages. See id. at § 50. But
his solution encounters the familiar fairness objection, commonly discussed in connec-
tion with the remedial choice in nuisance law between injunction and damages, that it
gives the breaching party all of the gains from trade.
47 French, supra note 3, at 1317. The law of trusts, which regulates a property ar-
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the power to do themselves.
IV
COERCION IN THE PRIVATE SPHERE: THE CASE OF
DISCRETIONARY SERVITUDES
One of the most striking things about recent commentary on
servitudes is how scholars, in discussing the problem of coercion,
tend to focus exclusively on public coercion, while denying or mini-
mizing the phenomenon of private coercion. 48 One familiar objec-
tion to the touch and concern doctrine and the changed conditions
doctrine, for example, focuses on the fact that they involve judicial
discretion. Legal scholars worry that judicial discretion will be a
source of coercion of private actors even when the court attempts to
act in good faith.49 Their argument for limiting judicial discretion
through abolition of the touch and concern and changed conditions
doctrines represents yet another instance of the naive version of the
free choice/coercion dichotomy. I do not wish to argue that no rea-
son exists to worry about judicial discretion. Rather, I want to sug-
gest that the problem of discretion is no less worrisome when it
appears in the form of private, "discretionary" servitudes than when
it appears in a judicial form.
Developers of planned residential communities commonly re-
serve to themselves or to homeowners' associations discretion in en-
forcement of restrictive covenants that are included in all of the
deeds to lots in the development. 50 The reasons usually given for
rangement that is structurally similar both to servitude and to relational contracts, per-
mits modification of charitable trusts through the cy pres doctrine, and also of private
trusts, although much less frequently and less explicitly. See, e.g., Petition of Wolcott, 95
N.H. 23, 56 A.2d 641 (1948) ("authority to describe from the express terms of a gift has
been granted in cases of emergency unforeseen [by testor]; Wesley United Methodist
Church v. Harvard College, 366 Mass. 247, 316 N.E.2d 620 (1974) (Cy pres applies if
trust is impracticable and restator shows charitable intent). See generally Haskell,Justifying
the Principle of Distributive Deviation in the Law of Trusts, 18 HASTINGS LJ. 267 (1967). Eng-
lish trust law explicitly permits beneficiaries to modify or terminate trusts despite the
settlor's intent. The English Variation of Trusts Act of 1958 authorizes courts to con-
sent to modification or termination on behalf of unborn or minor beneficiaries. A simi-
lar statute was enacted in Manitoba recently. Manitoba Act of 1983 to Amend the Trustee Act,
1982-83 MAN. REV. STAT. ch. 38.
48 For an exception, see the interesting discussion of regimentation in the contrac-
tual sphere, in Winokur, The Mixed Blessings of Promissory Servitudes: Toward Optimizing Eco-
nomic Utility, Individual Liberty and Personal Identity, 1988 Wis. L. REV. (forthcoming 1988).
49 E.g., Epstein, supra note 3, at 1366 ("With discretion comes uncertainty, and this
the parties may rightly (and expressly) fear.").
50 See, e.g., Rhue v. Cheyenne Homes, 168 Colo. 6, 449 P.2d 361 (1969) (archetec-
tural control committee had authority covenant to reject erection of buildings); Syrian
Antiochian Orthodox Archdiocese v. Palisades Assocs., 110 NJ. Super. 34, 264 A.2d
257 (1970) (upholding covenant allowing grantor to determine when prohibition on
erection of structures as improvements can be ignored). Owners' association architec-
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making servitudes in planned residential developments discretion-
ary are: first, to guarantee flexibility, in effect responding to the
problem of obsolescence; and, second, to provide security for the
developer's investment, especially while development is still on-go-
ing. But, as Professor Reichman has pointed out, the discretionary
power of the developer or the homeowners' association creates a
serious risk of coercion:
The residents may regard the facilities as inadequate or over-
crowded and consider their investment threatened by commercial
and industrial structures or high density and lower income hous-
ing. They may vehemently oppose certain standards decreed by
the architectural committee or the channelling of their payments
to certain projects. Above all, the residents may want the right to
structure the environment in which they live and raise their chil-
dren. Because of his superior legal position, however, the devel-
oper is free to ignore these desires when recognition of them
would impair his profit-making potential. 51
The same indeterminacy in the free choice/coercion dichotomy
that we identified in the debate over the touch and concern and
changed conditions doctrines occurs here. A formally coherent ar-
gument can be made that discretionary servitudes create no risk of
coercion because, so long as the residents knew or could have
known of the reserved discretion term, they freely chose to accept it
as a part of the deal. Moreover, if a homeowners' association holds
the discretion then the residents' voting rights assure their ultimate
control over objectionable terms.
Here again, however, the gap between formal and experienced
assent undermines the vision of unconstrained choice in the private
sphere. Residents may have evaluated inadequately the discretion-
ary power term.52 Even if they were fully aware of the term and can
demand compensation for it, the residents are at a disadvantage in
negotiating with the developer because the unpredictability would
make it difficult for them to value the discretionary power term.
Moreover, as a practical matter, developers possess considerably
more market power than residents. Some development firms are
tural review boards, for example, are commonly given discretion over both major
changes and matters of aesthetic taste and personal behavior. E.g., University Gardens
Property Owners Ass'n v. Solomon, 88 N.Y.S.2d 789 (Sup. Ct. 1946) (Association could
prohibit construction of dog house); West Hill Colony, Inc. v. Sauerwein, 78 Ohio L.
Abs. 340, 138 N.E.2d 404 (Ct. App. 1956) (purchaser bound to restrictions as to archi-
tecture, materials, color scheme, etc.).
51 Reichman, supra note 14, at 288.
52 One official with the federal Department of Housing and Urban Development
estimates that as many as 85%o of homeowners in planned residential communities are
not aware of applicable servitude restrictions or the existence of homeowners' associa-
tions. See Winokur, supra note 48.
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subsidiaries of large diversified corporate firms, 53 and virtually all,
whether corporate or individual, are repeat players who enjoy bar-
gaining advantages over purchaser-residents, who engage in such
transactions infrequently.
Discretionary power over landowners is no less problematic
when it is exercised by a homeowners' association. 54 Robert Ellick-
son and Gerald Frug debated the coercive or noncoercive character
of these institutions in a colloquy several years ago.55 I will not re-
hearse all of the arguments of that exchange, but will only point out
how here, again, choicelessness intrudes upon the "private" in pri-
vate volition.
Admirers of the governance structure of homeowners' associa-
tions, like Ellickson, emphasize how that structure creates the op-
portunity for actual participatory democracy in regulating
residential life. 56 They contend that this opportunity for participa-
tion assures that discretion in this context is noncoercive.
This view of homeowners' association overlooks the coercive
nature of membership in these institutions. Developers typically use
servitudes to compel purchasers to join homeowners' associations.
The purchase of land in planned resident communities is burdened
with the obligation of membership; purchasers simply do not have
the choice of opting out of the association's decisions while remain-
ing residents of the development. Claiming that the same degree of
assent exists in the decision to purchase the parcel of land as in the
"decision" to join the association distorts social reality. Claiming
that members of homeowners' associations assent to the discretion-
ary power that associations hold over various servitude terms fur-
ther distorts social reality. If discretion is seen as a threat to
individual autonomy, then there is no less reason for us to worry
about its dominating effect when exercised in the private sphere
than when exercised by courts under the rubrics of touch and con-
cern or changed conditions.
53 See L. GREBLER, LARGE SCALE HOUSING AND REAL ESTATE FIRMS 8-9, 14-15
(1973). See also L. GOODKIN, WHEN REAL ESTATE AND HOME BUILDING BECOMES BIG
BUSINESS 22-23, 25 (1974).
54 For a description of the practical control that developers exert over homeown-
ers' associations, see Barton & Silverman, Common Interest Homeowners 'Associations: Private
Government and the Public Interest Revisited (forthcoming in PUBLIC AFFAIRS REPORT, March
1988).
55 Ellickson, supra note 12; Ellickson, A Reply to Michelman and Frug, 130 U. PA. L.
REV. 1602 (1982); Frug, supra note 13. See also Frug, supra note 6.
56 See Ellickson, supra note 12.
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THE CLARK-RUNDELL DEBATE REVISITED
Edna St. Vincent Millay once wrote in a letter to a friend, "It is
not true that life is one damn thing after another-it is one damn
thing over and over."' 57 One sometimes gets the same feeling about
law reform. More than four decades after the American Law Insti-
tute produced its first restatement of the law of servitudes,58 legal
scholarship still frames issues of servitudes law through the same
discourse that marked the debates surrounding that notorious fail-
ure. Then, as now, mainstream scholars argued from the same
premise, the free choice/coercion dichotomy, to diametrically op-
posed conclusions. Comparing those debates with their counter-
parts forty years later, one is struck by the similarity in the legal
discourse surrounding the two projects; the sense of stasis grows as
one moves from one period to the next, belying the notion of legal
progress.
The most prominent debate over the first restatement of servi-
tudes occurred between Charles Clark, then a judge on the Second
Circuit and author of an influential little book on real covenants, 59
and the Reporter, Professor Oliver Rundell, of the University of
Wisconsin law faculty. Clark favored allowing both benefits and ob-
ligations of promises concerning land use to run freely. Rundell ob-
jected to binding any persons other than the original promisor to
the promise on the ground that you cannot bind a stranger with the
promises of another.
Both sides used the rhetoric of individual freedom of choice
and constraint. Clark, like Professor Epstein, thought that freedom
of contract necessitated elimination of the requirement of horizon-
tal privity of estate and other obstacles to enforcing obligations
against the promisor's successors. Bitterly attacking Rundell's re-
tention of the horizontal privity rule,6 0 Clark characterized the rule
as resulting from "an unusually uncompromising adherence to the
policy of outlawing parties' bargainings contrary to the trend of
modern legal thinking." 61 But Rundell, like Professor French and
Dean Reichman, insisted that there is no paradox in constraining
freedom of contract to preserve freedom of contract. For Rundell
the question was not whether freedom of contract should be en-
forced, but rather, freedom of contract for whom. Thus he stated,
57 Letters of Edna St. Vincent Aillay, (A. Macdougal ed. 1952).
58 V RESTATEMENT OF PROPERTY §§ 450-568 (1944).
59 C. CLARK, supra note 37.
60 V RESTATEMENT OF PROPERTY § 534 (1944).
61 Clark, The American Law Institute's Law of Real Covenants, 52 YALE L.J. 699, 726
(1943).
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"Th[e] problem is not 'What can parties do with their own?' but
'What can parties to a promise do to persons who are not par-
ties?' "62 He thought that the doctrine of promises running with the
land was "anomalous," and as inconsistent with freedom to alienate
land. He stated, "[The doctrine] has within it the certainty of in-
creasing the hazards incident to the acquisition of title to land and
thus the possibility of interfering with the freedom with which land
is alienated." 63
What I find interesting about this debate is not only how Clark
and Rundell developed contradictory arguments even though they
drew on the same stock of rhetorical moves, but that probably most
legal academics today actually think that the two men fundamentally
disagreed with each other. After all, Rundell was the Conceptualist
and Clark was the Realist. The Clark-Rundell debate has a dead end
quality (although the ad hominem remarks exchanged between the
two men are very entertaining), not because they so basically dis-
agreed, but because so little separated them. They never succeeded
in really engaging each other.
CONCLUSION
The first restatement on servitudes is now generally regarded as
a failure; can the current project avoid the same result? Realizing
the Reporter's goal of reducing the technicality of this notorious
area of law will certainly be a positive contribution. After all, a pro-
ject that eliminates the distinction between corporeal and incorpo-
real hereditament cannot be all bad.
Tidying up the doctrinal messiness of servitude law alone will
not, however, guarantee the net success of the new restatement.
Like other law reform efforts, simplification of the law of servitudes
is likely to have a pacifying effect. It lulls us into supposing that the
conflicts between basic social and political visions have, in some
meaningful sense, been resolved through careful balancing of all the
relevant and competing interests, goals, and values. More impor-
tantly, it lulls us into accepting arrangements of social power as
(more or less, but acceptably) free from the problem of dominance.
Furthermore, to the extent that dominance persists as the basis
upon which some disputes among land holders are resolved, despite
law reform, the effort at reform can lead to resignation: we say that
these reforms are the best that we can do and that dominance is a
fact of life.
62 Rundell, Judge Clark on the American Law Institute's Law of Real Covenants: A Com-
ment, 53 YALE LJ. 312, 314 (1944).
63 Id. at 315.
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Charles Clark said that the first restatement was "a prime case
study of Institute methodology" and that the result "suggests once
more how difficult is the attempt to combine all the varied and fluid
developments of all the courts of all the different sovereignties of
this country into one uncompromising black-letter statement to rep-
resent 'the law'. . .. 64 Echoing a recurrent Realist theme, he ar-
gued that the "real" rules are context-bound and resist reduction to
a restatement.
Clark's objections to the first restatement's format was instru-
mental. He saw different policies at work in different contexts. The
point that I want to make, however, is not instrumental in the stan-
dard sense of that term. Rather, it concerns social visions. There
are intractable conflicts among our visions of the proper ordering of
society and social relationships. These conflicts are deeply imbed-
ded in our consciousness and are not susceptible to final solutions.
This does not mean that settled legal practices do not or cannot
exist. They can and do exist, and restatements can succeed in
describing them. But settled legal practices are not settlements of
fundamental political and social controversies; the claim that they
are is just another attempt to trump some opposed normative claim
and entrench a particular set of power relationships.
Reflecting, rather than repressing, both our existing doctrinal
conflicts and our normative conflicts that remain just beneath the
surface of settled doctrinal practices, requires an open-ended re-
statement. Its norms must be such that they do not stifle attempts
to destabilize settled doctrinal practices. To the extent that this re-
statement project itself is just such an attempt, I welcome it; but to
the extent that it becomes yet another frozen structure of rules, I
oppose it.
(54 Clark, supra note 61, at 701.
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